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A B S T R A C T
Modern UK drug regulation began in 1971. In view of significant neo-liberal political reforms to drug regulation
in the UK and US since the early 1990s, this article compares the performance of UK and US drug safety reg-
ulation during both 1971–1992 and 1993–2004, by investigating drug safety withdrawals (DSWs). Combined
quantitative and comprehensive qualitative regulatory case history methodology is employed to explain com-
parative trends in DSWs and relate them to the key claims of central regulatory theories. It is found that there
was a dramatic increase in DSWs in the US during 1993–2004 compared with 1971–1992, and a major increase
in the extent to which drugs withdrawn on safety grounds in the UK were left on the US market. Analysis reveals
that these findings are best explained by changes in institutional regulatory culture at FDA, consequent upon
neo-liberal reforms during 1993–2004, which meant that US regulators adopted more permissive interpretations
of safety signals and associated risk-benefit assessments leading to more unsafe drugs being approved on to the
US market than during 1971–1992. Changes in the UK are less marked because it already embraced a relatively
permissive regulatory culture during 1971–1992 and neo-liberal reforms post-1992 were more attenuated. It is
concluded that the changes support corporate bias theory, and that, to improve patient protection, drug safety
regulation in the UK and US should shift direction towards the US regulatory model of 1971–92.
1. Background and objectives
Government pharmaceutical regulation is important to prevent pa-
tients from exposure to harmful unsafe drugs whose risks outweigh
their benefits. The last 25 years has seen an increase in international
studies of prescription drug safety regulation (Abraham and Lewis,
2000, Abraham and Reed, 2001; Daemmrich, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2003;
Wiktorowisz et al., 2012, 2018). However, confined to descriptions of
regulatory processes/standards, these studies are inconclusive about
the implications of policy arrangements for drug safety/regulatory
outcomes. Other significant political/organisational analyses of drug
safety regulation include Angell (2004), Carpenter (2010), Light
(2010), Goldacre (2012), Lexchin (2016) and Light and Maturo (2015)
but each is limited to a single nation. International comparisons of UK
and US drug safety regulatory processes and outcomes are available, but
outcome analyses neither span beyond the mid-1990s nor involve
comprehensive drug cohorts (Abraham, 1995, Abraham and Sheppard,
1999).
Yet, since 1990 the socio-political terrain of UK and US drug
regulation has changed considerably. Modern UK drug regulation began
in 1971 under extreme state secrecy of the 1968 Medicines Act, but the
1992 UK Code on Access to Government Information and the 2000 UK
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act slightly increased transparency and
accountability of British drug regulation, though legislative oversight
by UK and EU Parliaments remained minimal during 1993–2004
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2005). From 1989, the UK drug
regulatory authority was transformed into the Medicines Control
Agency (MCA) until 2003 when it became the Medicines and Health-
care Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). Following UK Government
policy, from 1989, the British regulatory authority shifted from being
funded equally by direct taxation and fees from the pharmaceutical
industry to being funded 100% by industry fees. Pharmaceutical com-
panies agreed to the arrangement in exchange for shortening drug
regulatory review times at MCA. The first MCA director, who came
from industry, instigated an enduring policy of making the regulatory
agency more responsive to industry demands by cutting drug review
times by 24% in one year and increasing consultation between industry
and regulators (Abraham and Lewis, 2000:60-76).
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Significantly, in 1995, the European Medicines Agency (EMA), was
established to administer an EU-wide ‘centralised’ regulatory procedure
(CP) for most innovative drugs, drawing on its expert Committee on
Human Medicinal Products (CHMP) to make regulatory decisions.
Consequently, many new drugs, including some drugs in our cohort,
entered the UK market via EMA-CHMP regulatory decisions. EMA is
funded by industry fees rising from 20% in 1995 to 75% in 2010 (Davis
and Abraham, 2013). It publishes reports justifying centralised EU ap-
provals, thus increasing the accountability of regulatory decision-
making regarding many new drugs entering the UK market after 1995
(Abraham and Lewis, 2000).
Meanwhile, in the US, the 1992 Prescription Drug Users Fee Act
(PDUFA) was introduced because Congress, which had previously
funded the US drug regulatory agency (FDA), entirely from direct
taxation, refused to fund it adequately. PDUFA saw FDA become in-
creasingly funded by industry fees reaching 50% by 2002 and over 60%
by 2010 (Davis and Abraham, 2013; Josefson, 2002). To receive this
funding, statutory drug review deadlines were introduced requiring
FDA to cut its review times dramatically. Funding renewal every five
years was conditional on making such cuts to the satisfaction of Con-
gress and the pharmaceutical industry. PDUFA funds had to be spent on
regulatory review and not post-market safety surveillance or FOI re-
quests (whose responsiveness declined). Between 1993 and 2008, FDA
shortened drug review times by more than half so by 1994 it was ap-
proving drugs faster than MCA (Davis and Abraham, 2013; Government
Accounting Office [GAO] 1995:11; Olsen, 2013). While in 1988 only
4% of new prescription drugs introduced on to the world market were
first approved by FDA, by 1998 this had risen to 66% (Willman, 2000).
After PDUFA and the 1997 FDA Modernisation Act (FDAMA), fur-
ther changes ensued, such as increased industry consultation with FDA
on new drugs under review; inclusion of (non-voting) industry parti-
cipation on FDA expert advisory committees; and approval of some new
drugs based on significantly less clinical trial evidence via expedited
pathways (FDA, 1998a; 1998b; 2000; Lurie and Sasich, 1999). Between
1994 and 2004, Congress rarely held hearings about FDA's performance
in assessing drug safety, as it had done during the 1970s and 1980s, but
instead persistently interrogated the agency about how it could accel-
erate approval of new drugs.
An important policy question, therefore, is whether drug safety
regulatory outcomes have altered since these changes in political con-
text, and if so, what explanatory relationship, if any, exists between the
two. The answer to that question can then empirically ground the an-
swer to the social scientific question of which main regulatory theory
best characterises these changes: neo-liberal theory that they have been
in the interests of public health; disease-politics theory that they have
been driven by patient demand; capture theory that regulatory agencies
have drifted away from their mandate to protect public health towards
promoting industry interests instead; or corporate bias theory that
regulatory agencies and Executive/Legislative arms of Government
have combined to prioritise industry interests over those of public
health (Abraham, 1995, Abraham and Lewis, 2000, Davis and
Abraham, 2013; Carpenter and Moss, 2014; Lexchin, 2016).
Several quantitative input-outcome studies of US drug regulation
have examined statistical associations between discretely defined reg-
ulatory inputs, such as industry fees; reduced review-times (including
expedited pathways); and/or near-deadline approvals, on the one hand,
and post-market regulatory outcomes, on the other, such as number of
drug safety withdrawals (DSWs) – i.e. drugs approved on to the market
by a government regulatory authority, but then subsequently removed
from that market for safety reasons by the regulatory agency or man-
ufacturer; safety-related changes to drug labelling (e.g. warnings); and/
or regulatory-communications to healthcare professionals. The US
Government Accountability Office [GAO] (2002) reported that post-
PDUFA reductions in review times were correlated with more US DSWs
and Mostaghim et al. (2017) demonstrated a statistical association be-
tween shorter FDA review-times and increased adverse safety-related
labelling changes. However, Berndt et al. (2005), Carpenter et al.
(2008) and Downing et al. (2017) recorded no association between US
DSWs and FDA review-times per se, though the latter two found a sta-
tistical association between near-deadline approvals and increased US
DSWs/safety-warnings. We found no input-outcome studies of UK drug
safety regulation, though Zeitoun et al. (2015) reported no quantitative
correlation between near-deadline approvals/reduced review-time and
DSWs at EU level.
These input-outcome investigations provide temporal comparison
relating to political change within single-nations/territories, but no in-
ternational comparative analysis. Moreover, exclusive emphasis on
input-outcome quantitative associations offers little understanding of
the processes of regulatory assessment, such as medico-scientific
knowledge/evidence available to regulators and the weighing up that
evidence within regulatory decisions/actions. Yet such social scientific
understanding is vital to make rational judgements about the public-
health-protective performance of regulation. For example, if a reg-
ulatory agency enforces more DSWs after a political intervention (e.g.
introduction of industry fees) than before, then that could be because,
in the later period, the agency is approving more unsafe drugs (public-
health-endangering) or because it has become stricter in policing post-
market safety (public-health-protective). Furthermore, it is impossible
to judge whether leaving a drug on the market, while adding a warning,
rather than withdrawing it, is a safety-protective or safety-endangering
regulatory measure without case-study analysis of the regulatory as-
sessment involved. Case-study analysis is also needed because there is
no such thing as a typical DSW – regulatory decisions are made on a
case-by-case basis, although the possibility of a DSW decision should
always arise where a product's risks are deemed to outweigh its bene-
fits. This usually emerges due to pre-market or post-market evidence of
adverse drug effects on patient safety, known as safety signals (e.g.
heart attacks, liver dysfunction, arrhythmia, mortality).
Only Abraham and Davis (2005) have conducted an international
comparative analysis combining quantitative comparisons and com-
prehensive case-study analyses of all DSWs in more than one country
(UK and US). However, their comparison was confined to 1971–1992
and solely spatial. In this paper, we follow Abraham and Davis's (2005)
approach of quantitative comparisons combined with qualitative reg-
ulatory case-history scrutiny of each DSW and go beyond it by com-
paring the UK with the US before and after significant political changes
evident in both countries.
Abraham and Davis (2005) demonstrated that there were over twice
as many UK DSWs as US DSWs during 1971–1992 because FDA im-
posed more stringent safety standards, especially by approving fewer
unsafe drugs on to the market than the British regulatory authorities.
The policy implication was that more stringent US drug safety regula-
tion (1971–1992) delivered additional safety protection relative to the
UK, even if it approved drugs slower than UK regulators. The FDA's
greater stringency compared with UK regulatory authorities in that
period was explained by a more critical institutional stance towards the
pharmaceutical industry due to: more legislative (Congressional)
oversight on how well FDA protected citizens from unsafe drugs; a more
minimal role for industry consultation and outside expert advisers with
industry conflicts of interest to influence regulatory decisions; and
greater public/legal accountability, via extensive (FOI) legislation
(1967 US FOI Act).
Here, we compare UK and US DSWs from 1993 to 2004 inclusive
and investigate how DSWs have changed compared with 1971–1992.
Drawing particularly on our qualitative case-study analyses, we then
systematically provide social scientific explanations for those changes.
Our time-period selection is explicitly linked to political context. Like
Olsen (2013), we consider 1993–2004 because after the 2004 rofecoxib
(Vioxx) arthritis drug disaster, estimated to have caused over 60,000
heart attacks in both countries, further changes to pharmaceutical
regulation occurred, which merit separate study (Institute of Medicine,
2006). Nonetheless, lessons from the 1993–2004 period provide crucial
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insights into many regulatory policy challenges that still obtain.
2. Methods and data sources
Extensive documentary data were collected on all drugs withdrawn
from the UK and/or US markets from 1993 to 2004 inclusive. For
quantitative temporal analyses (allowing for a four-year follow-up
period explained below) we collected DSW data with a cut-off date of
2008. We employed two core analytical methodologies: (1) quantitative
surveys and analyses of all DSWs; and (2) comprehensive qualitative
case-study analysis of all drugs in the sample to clarify/extend findings
beyond quantified trends, to discover reasons for DSWs in relation to
how evidence was assessed within regulatory decision-making pro-
cesses. Fieldwork spanned many years in both countries from mid-
2000s. We sometimes refer to ‘UK/EU regulators’ because some UK
DSWs were made by UK regulators alone, but others by EMA for drugs
approved EU-wide after 1995.
Data on individual drugs were collected and reviewed from:
PubMed, Web of Science and ASSIA; Scrip World Pharmaceutical News;
WHO databases; publicly-available court documents; pharmaceutical
manufacturers' websites; FDA drug-approval packages; US Federal
Register; Medwatch safety-related drug label changes; Public-Health
Advisories and Dear Healthcare Professional letters; transcripts of FDA
advisory committee meetings; FDA publications, including Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) Report to the Nation, FDA
Consumer, and PDUFA-related reports to Congress; Congressional
hearings; MCA and MHRA publications, such as Current Problems in
Pharmacovigilance and Drug Safety Update; MHRA website; publicly-
available minutes of meetings of UK Committee on Safety of Medicines
and its Sub-Committees; annual reports of MCA, MHRA and their expert
advisory committees; Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry (ABPI) Compendium of Data Sheets and Summaries of Product
Characteristics until 1999 and Medicines Compendium after 1999; UK
FOIA requests to MHRA; European Public Assessment Reports; safety
alerts, press releases, expert opinions, and minutes of meetings of EMA's
CHMP. A list of all UK and US DSWs from 1993 to 2008 was compiled
from these databases and relevant published surveys (Berndt et al.,
2005; Carpenter et al., 2008; CDER, 2006; Fung et al., 2001; Tufts,
2005).
2.1. Numbers of DSWs by approval and withdrawal dates
Counting DSWs is complex. From 1993 to 2008, there were 38
DSWs in the UK, US or both (Table 1). Consistent with Abraham and
Davis's (2005) criteria, these include all new molecular entities (NMEs),
new formulations/combinations of NMEs, and any products containing
a new isomer/ester/salt, but exclude new dosage forms. Table 1 also
presents DSWs subsequently re-instated. Abraham and Davis (2005)
excluded re-instated drugs. To be consistent with their analysis, we also
exclude re-instated drugs from our quantitative comparisons regarding
numbers of DSWs, DSW rates, and divergent regulatory outcomes, but
we include them in our qualitative case-study analysis of decision-
making processes. Table 1 includes five drugs withdrawn in
1993–2004, which were originally marketed in the UK before 1971
(‘pre-licensing’) because they were subsequently granted full product
licences under modern UK drug regulation. Additionally, we have up-
dated Abraham and Davis (2005) for the period 1971–1992 with a 2008
cut-off date.
Every DSW may be identified either by when it was approved on to
the market (approval date) or when it was withdrawn from the market
(withdrawal date). After approval, it generally takes some time for a
drug to be withdrawn. Hence, when comparing the numbers of DSWs in
1971–1992 with 1993–2004, by year of approval, it is preferable to
allow some time lag after the later period to achieve a fair comparison.
For example, eight of the drugs withdrawn in the US, and fourteen
withdrawn in the UK, since the end of 1992 were approved in the
Table 1
Drug Safety Withdrawals 1993 to September 2008 (including re-instated
drugs).
Year First
Withdrawn
patient
exposure (M)a
Drugs generic (Trade
Name)
clinical target
other notes
UK
dates on market/
OTHER
SCENARIOS
US
dates on market/
OTHER
SCENARIOS
1993
(0.01)
flosequinan (Manoplax)
congestive heart failure
1992–1993 1992–1993
1993
(0.01)
nebacumab (Centoxin)
sepsis
1991–1993 APPROVAL
REFUSED
1993
(0.01)
Etretinate
(Tegison-US)
(Tigason-UK)
psoriasis
1981–1993 1986–2002
1994
(0.01)
Remoxipride
(Roxiam)
schizophrenia/psychoses
1990–1994 NOT APPROVED
(application
withdrawn
1994)
1995
(0.001)
naftidrofuryl oxalate i.v.
(Praxilene i.v) peripheral
vascular disease
not NME
1978–1995 NOT MARKETED
1995
(0.1)
Probucol
(Lorelco – US)
(Lurselle – UK)
hypercholesterolaemia
1982–1997 1977–1995
1997
(0.1)
pemoline (Cylert–US)
(Volital–UK)
ADHD/hyperkinesias
Pre-licencing-1997 1975–2005
1997
(10.0)
Fenfluramine
(Pondimin–US)
(Ponderax–UK)
obesity
Pre-licencing-1997 1973–1997
1997
(10.0)
Dexfenfluramine
(Redux–US)
(Adifax–UK)
obesity
not NME
1990–1997 1996–1997
1997
(1.0)
Troglitazone
(Rezulin–US)
(Romozin–UK)
diabetes
1997–1997 1997–2000
1998
(1.0)
Terfenadine
(Seldane)
anti-histamine
1980– NOT
WITHDRAWN
1985–1998
1998
(0.1)
Mibefradil
(Posicor)
hypertension/angina
1997–1998 1997–1998
1998
(0.01)
Bromfenac
(Duract)
acute pain
NOT MARKETED 1997–1998
1998
(0.01)
Tolcapone
(Tasmar)
Parkinson's
EU-reinstated
1997–1998/
reinstated 2004-
via EU-
Centralised-
Procedure (CP)
1998- NOT
WITHDRAWN
1998
(0.01)
Sertindole
(Serdolect)
schizophrenia/psychoses
EU-reinstated
1996–1998/
reinstated 2002-
via CP
APPROVAL
REFUSED
1999
(0.1)
Astemizole
(Hismanal)
anti-histamine
1983–1999 1988–1999
1999
(0.01)
Grepafloxacin
(Raxar)
pneumonia/bronchitis
1997–1999 1997–1999
1999
(0.1)
Trovafloxacin
(Trovan)
bacterial infection
1998–1999 via
EU-CP
1998 - NOT
WITHDRAWN
1999
(0.01)
rotavirus vaccine
(Rotashield)
rotavirus
1999–2000 via
EU-CP
1998–1999
2000
(0.001)
Pumactant
(ALEC)
respiratory distress
syndrome
1994–2000 NOT MARKETED
(continued on next page)
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period 1971–1992, so in a quantitative comparison of DSWs by year of
approval, those drugs would be counted in the earlier period, even
though they are seen as withdrawals years later. Thus, our later com-
parison period, 1993–2004, allows a time lag to 2008 when counting
DSWs by year of approval. For quantitative analyses by year of with-
drawal, there is a straight comparison between the two periods
1971–1992 and 1993–2004.
Excluding re-instated drugs, Tables 2 and 3 show the absolute
numbers of DSWs in the two countries in the two periods according to
year of approval and withdrawal, respectively. These figures reiterate
Abraham and Davis (2005) that from 1971 to 1992 the UK had over
twice as many DSWs as the US, whether calculated by year of approval
(UK/US ratio 36:17 = 2.1) or year of withdrawal (UK/US ratio
23:9 = 2.6). Regarding UK DSWs by year of approval from 1993 to
2004, Table 2 excludes five ‘pre-licensing’ drugs because they have no
approval dates as such (so it could be that there were 17 UK DSWs from
1993 to 2004, rather than 12). Tables 2 and 3 show dramatic changes in
the UK/US DSW ratio in 1993–2004 whether by year of approval
(12:17 = 0.7 or 17:17 = 1.0 including all pre-licensors) or by year of
withdrawal (22:18 = 1.2).
Evidently, there has been a change from twice as many DSWs in the
UK as in the US during 1971–1992 to both countries having a similar
number during 1993–2004. Tables 2 and 3 also demonstrate that most
of this change results from many more DSWs in the US during
1993–2004 compared with 1971–1992. By year of approval US DSWs
have almost doubled (1.4:0.8 = 1.75) and nearly quadrupled by year of
withdrawal (1.5:0.4 = 3.75). By contrast, UK DSWs have increased
much less (1.8:1.0 = 1.8 by year of withdrawal) or even fallen on one
measure (1.0:1.6 = 0.6 by year of approval; 1.4:1.6 = 0.9, including
pre-licensors).
2.2. Absolute numbers of DSWs and DSW rates
Some scholars and regulators contend that DSW rate (percentage of
drugs withdrawn out of all those approved in any given period) is a
better measure than absolute number of DSWs, thus implying that the
public health problem of DSWs should only be weighed quantitatively
relative to total numbers of drugs approved (Bakke et al., 1995; CDER,
2006; Jefferys et al., 1998; Tufts, 2005). However, a small number of
DSWs, including drug disasters like Vioxx, could have more significant
health implications than a large number of other drug approvals,
especially if only a small proportion of such approvals are needed
therapeutically (Angell, 2004; La Revue Prescrire, 2005). Relying solely
on DSW rates, therefore, could underplay important problems in drug
safety regulation.
In calculating them, scholars typically count only NMEs, so we ex-
clude re-instated drugs and non-NMEs from our analyses of DSW rates
(Table 1). Our temporal comparative analysis of DSW rates by year of
approval for 1971-92 allows a four-year follow-up period to 1996, to-
gether with our estimate of the DSW rate for 1993–2004 allowing
follow-up to 2008. By this method, DSW rates for 1971–1992 are 5.9%
Table 1 (continued)
Year First
Withdrawn
patient
exposure (M)a
Drugs generic (Trade
Name)
clinical target
other notes
UK
dates on market/
OTHER
SCENARIOS
US
dates on market/
OTHER
SCENARIOS
2000
(1.0)
Cisapride
(Propulsid–US)
(Prepulsid–UK)
gastro-oesophageal
reflux
1988–2000 1993–2000
2000
(1.0)
alosetron (Lotronex)
Irritable bowel
syndrome
US-reinstated
NOT APPROVED 2000–2000
reinstated 2002-
2001
(0.01)
Rapacuronium
(Raplon) surgical muscle
relaxation
NOT APPROVED 1999–2001
2001
(0.1)
Droperidol
(Inapsine–US)
(Droleptan–UK)
anaesthesia/sedation
Pre-licencing-2001 1970- NOT
WITHDRWN
2001
(0.001)
Levacetylmethadol
(Orlaam)
opiate addiction
1997–2001 via
EU-CP
1993–2003
2001
(1.0)
Cerivastatin
(Baycol–US)
(Lipoba–UK)
hypercholesterolaemia
1997–2001 1997–2001
2003
(0.1)
Nefazodone
(Serzone–US)
(Dutonin–UK)
depression
1993–2003 1994- NOT
WITHDRAWN
2004
(10.0)
Rofecoxib
(Vioxx)
arthritis
1999–2004 1999–2004
2005
(0.1)
co-proxamol
(Darvocet)
mild/moderate pain
not NME
Pre-licensing-
2005
1972- NOT
WITHDRAWN.
2005 (0.01) Natalizumab
(Tysabri)
multiple sclerosis/
Crohn's
US-reinstated
2006- NOT
WITHDRAWN via
EU-CP
2004–2005/
reinstated 2006-
2005
(1.0)
Valdecoxib
(Bextra)
arthritis
2003–2005 via
EU-CP
2001–2005
2005
(0.001)
hydromorphone
hydrochloride-extended
release
(Palladone-SR)
moderate/severe pain
not NME
2003- NOT
WITHDRAWN.
2004–2005
2005
(0.001)
Technetium (99m-Tc)
fanolesomab
(Neutrospec)
appendicitis
radiodiagnosis
NOT MARKETED 2004–2005
2007
(0.01)
Pergolide
(Permax–US)
(Celance–UK)
Parkinson's
1990- NOT
WITHDRAWN
1988–2007
2007
(0.01)
Tegaserod
(Zelnorm)
IBS/constipation
NOT APPROVED 2002–2007
2007
(0.01)
Aprotinin
(Trasylol)
surgical bleed
suppressant
Pre-licensing-2007 1993–2007
2007
(0.01)
Lumiracoxib
(Prexige)
arthritis
2003–2007 NOT APPROVED
2008
(0.01)
Gatifloxacin
(Tequin)
bacterial infection
NOT MARKETED 1999–2008
a Estimated patient exposure in UK, US or both to decimal point in millions
(e.g. 0.1 means 100,000s, 1.0 means millions).
Table 2
Absolute numbers of UK & US DSWs according to year of approval.
Period (years) 1971–1992 (22yrs) 1993–2004 (12 yrs)
US absolute number (average per year) 17 (0.8) 17 (1.4)
UK absolute number (average per year) 36 (1.6) 12 (1.0)
Table 3
Absolute numbers of UK & US DSWs according to year of withdrawal.
Period (years) 1971–1992 (22yrs) 1993–2004 (12 yrs)
US absolute number (average per year) 9 (0.4 per yr) 18 (1.5 per yr)
UK absolute number (average per year) 23 (1.0 per yr) 22 (1.8 per yr)
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(28/478) in the UK and 2.3% (10/439) in the US. We also estimate a US
DSW rate of 3.9% (14/357) for 1993–2004. Hence, the US DSW rate
increased from 2.3% to 3.9% - a growth factor of 1.7, almost exactly the
growth factor of 1.75 we discovered when calculating the absolute
number of US DSWs by year of approval. Evidently, whether one esti-
mates DSWs by absolute numbers or NME rates, they have approxi-
mately doubled in the US in 1993–2004 compared with 1971–1992, so
increases in US DSWs are not merely due to FDA approving more drugs.
We could not calculate the UK DSW rate for 1993–2004 because,
shockingly, the MHRA was unable/unwilling to provide us with an
accurate list of all NMEs. Nevertheless, from other sources, we estimate
and compare the UK DSW rates for 1971-88 and 1989–1994 by year of
approval, i.e. before and after MCA's industry fee expansion, accelera-
tion of drug reviews and increased industry consultation. For this
comparison, to be fair, we allow a fourteen-year follow up for the
earlier period (1971–1988) because there are fourteen years to 2008
beyond the end of the later period (1989–94) during which drugs ap-
proved between 1989 and 1994 could be withdrawn. Using this
method, the UK DSW rate for 1971-88 is 5.5% (20/364) and 4.3% (7/
161) for 1989–94. Hence, the UK DSW rate by year of approval has
decreased by a factor of 0.8 (4.3/5.5) in 1989–1994 compared with
1971–1988. This is similar to the 0.6 shrinkage factor in the absolute
number of UK DSWs for 1993–2004 by year of approval. However, this
must be weighed against the fact that the absolute number of UK DSWs
by year of withdrawal has grown by a factor of 1.8. Overall, the precise
quantitative extent of change in UK DSWs between 1971-1992 and
1993–2004 is equivocal but it is clear that it is relatively small com-
pared with the unequivocal evidence of a marked increase in US DSWs
in the later period by all measures.
Hence, the extent of DSWs in the two countries has, on both mea-
sures, converged considerably in 1993–2004 compared with 1971–1992.
The convergence is due to the dramatic increase in US DSWs during the
later period from a relatively low incidence in the earlier period, while
the extent of UK DSWs in the later period has not changed much from
its relatively high incidence in the earlier period. Taking six-year ap-
proval cohorts with fourteen years follow-up for UK approvals and four
years follow-up for US approvals, Figs. 1 and 2 elaborate this con-
vergence by showing that US DSW rates, by year of approval, are never
as high as UK DSW rates, but after 1992 they rise sharply to 3.8% and
by 2004 they are approaching UK rates (which are declining from
4.3%).
2.3. Beyond counting DSWs: divergent UK/US regulatory outcomes
We define a DSW divergent approval outcome as when a drug is
approved and withdrawn in one country, but never approved or never
marketed in the other country. A DSW divergent withdrawal outcome is
when a drug is withdrawn in one country but either never withdrawn,
or withdrawn more than one year later, in the other country. To further
investigate the changing nature of drug safety regulation in both
countries, we conducted a quantitative comparative analysis of di-
vergent regulatory outcomes (approvals and withdrawals) in the period
1971–1992 with 1993–2004, allowing four-year follow-up to 2008
when analysing divergent approvals, according to year of divergent ap-
proval outcome.
For 1971–1992, we calculated 21 divergent regulatory outcomes
(divergent approvals and withdrawals) pertaining to a total of 27 DSWs.
Excluding re-instated drugs, from 1993 to 2004, there were 17 di-
vergent regulatory outcomes relating to 26 DSWs. Figs. 3 and 4 show a
breakdown of the different types of divergent regulatory outcomes for
the two periods. Divergent approval/marketing outcomes in the US (i.e.
Fig. 1. UK trends in NME withdrawal rates allowing 14 years of follow-up for
each approval cohort.
Fig. 2. US trends in NME withdrawal rates allowing 4 years of follow-up for
each approval cohort.
Fig. 3. Divergent regulatory outcomes 1971–1992. NM-US – Not Marketed in
US: Approved and later withdrawn in UK but never marketed in US. Unknown
whether approval sought in US. NA-US – Not Approved in US: Approved and
later withdrawn in UK. Approval sought in US but drug never marketed there.
NM-UK – Not Marketed in UK: Approved and later withdrawn in US but never
marketed in UK. Unknown whether approval sought in UK. NA-UK – Not
Approved in UK: Approved and later withdrawn in US. Approval sought in UK
directly (or via EU regulatory procedure) but drug never marketed there. NW-
US – Not Withdrawn in US: Safety withdrawal in UK but left on US market (or
discontinued in US by manufacturer, but not for safety reasons). DW-US –
Delayed Withdrawal in US: At least a year's delay between withdrawal in UK
and subsequent withdrawal in US. NW-UK – Not Withdrawn in UK: Safety
withdrawal in US but still marketed in UK (or discontinued in UK by manu-
facturer, but not for safety reasons). DW-UK –Delayed Withdrawal in UK: At
least a year's delay between withdrawal in US and subsequent withdrawal in
UK.
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drugs not approved/marketed in the US, but approved and withdrawn
in UK) account for 77% of all divergent regulatory outcomes in
1971–92, but only 18% in 1993–2004. Regarding divergent approval/
marketing outcomes in the UK (i.e. drugs not approved/marketed in the
UK, but approved and withdrawn in the US), they accounted for just
10% of all divergent regulatory outcomes in 1971–92, but grew to 24%
in 1993–2004.
Divergent withdrawal decisions in the US (i.e. drugs withdrawn for
safety reasons in the UK but left on the US market), accounted for just
14% of all divergent regulatory outcomes in 1971–1992, but climbed to
42% in 1993–2004. Divergent withdrawal decisions in the UK (drugs
withdrawn for safety reasons in the US but left on the UK market) did
not exist (0%) in 1971–1992, but accounted for 18% of all divergent
regulatory outcomes in 1993–2004.
These findings demonstrate that in 1971–1992 the DSW picture was
dominated by drugs being approved/marketed by UK regulators and
then having to be withdrawn in the UK, but never approved/marketed
in the US. From 1993 to 2004 that dominant picture no longer ob-
tained. The picture changed to be most strongly characterised by drugs
being withdrawn from the UK market for safety reasons, but those same
drugs being left on the US market. That scenario occurred three times
more often during 1993–2004 than in 1971–1992.
Moreover, during 1993–2004, drugs were more often approved/
marketed and then withdrawn in the US, but never approved/marketed
in the UK (24%), than they were approved/marketed and then with-
drawn in the UK, but never approved/marketed in the US (18%).
Indeed, in 1993–2004, drugs were more than twice as likely to be left
on the US market after having been withdrawn in the UK (42%) than
they were to be left on the UK market after having been withdrawn in
the US (18%), and they were three times as likely to be left on the US
market after having been withdrawn in the UK (42%) compared with
1971–92 (14%).
Assuming that non-approval of a drug in one country which is later
withdrawn in another country implies greater patient protection in the
former country, and failure by the latter country to withdraw a drug
that has been withdrawn for safety reasons in the former country im-
plies less patient protection, then our analysis of divergent regulatory
outcomes strongly suggests that FDA performance in protecting US ci-
tizens from unsafe drugs deteriorated in 1993–2004 relative to its
performance during 1971–92, and relative to the performance of the UK
regulatory authorities. By contrast, the patient-protective performance
of the UK regulatory authorities improved relative to FDA, and to pre-
1993 UK performance in keeping unsafe drugs off the market, but de-
teriorated relative to UK pre-1993 performance in terms of its decisions
on whether or not to withdraw drugs.
Yet, such assumptions may not necessarily be justified because non-
approval may not necessarily result from a regulatory agency spotting
safety signals missed by another regulatory authority or from having
higher approval standards. Other factors, such as post-marketing safety
information from other countries, while deciding about approval could
be involved. Such complex matters can only be settled by examining the
regulatory case-histories of the individual drugs, to which we now turn.
2.4. Beyond quantitative associations: explaining the changes in UK/US
DSW trends
Drawing on our qualitative analysis of the regulatory case-histories
of each drug, we explain the above trends by systematically examining
six hypotheses (H1–H6). Most attention is on the US because it is dra-
matic changes in US DSWs that mostly account for changes in the UK/
US comparative trends.
H1: The larger number of US DSWs during 1993–2004 is explained
by FDA becoming less tolerant of post-market drug risks than it was in
1971–92, and than the UK was in 1993–2004.
Our research does not support this hypothesis (advanced publicly by
some FDA managers) because FDA permitted marketing of troglitazone,
tolcapone, trovafloxacin and levacertylmethadol for several years in the
US after they had been withdrawn in the UK by UK/EU regulatory
authorities. In fact, we found that FDA was more tolerant of post-market
drug risks in 1993–2004 than it was during 1971–1992, and than EMA
was during 1993–2004. This is probably because under PDUFA from
1993 to 2004, FDA was not permitted to spend PDUFA funding on post-
marketing safety regulation (GAO, 2002:7) It is less clear whether MCA
consistently adopted a more precautionary approach to post-market
safety problems than FDA during 1993–2004. MCA did so in the cases
of pemoline, troglitazone and droperidol, but permitted marketing of
terfenadine and probucol after their US withdrawal.
H2: There has been an increase in US DSWs from 1993 to 2004
because most serious drug toxicity leading to withdrawal can only be
discovered post-marketing and during 1971–1992 drugs were typically
marketed first in UK/Europe so that FDA had the benefit of post-mar-
keting safety information from UK/Europe in that period, but in
1993–2004 the US was usually the market of first launch so FDA was
deprived of such post-marketing safety information.
This hypothesis was also put forward by some FDA managers. UK
and US regulators routinely informed each other about DSW decisions
and shared post-marketing safety data that informed decisions, but
frequently still made different decisions (Abraham and Sheppard,
1999). However, Abraham and Davis (2005) demonstrated that for 40%
(10/25) of all DSWs in the UK or US from 1971 to 1992, there was a
signal of the safety problems that ultimately led to drug withdrawal
contained in the pre-market data submitted for approval. Our analysis of
regulatory approval case histories of drugs withdrawn in 1993–2004
shows that signals of toxicity were present in data submitted before
approval for most of those products. Table 4 shows that, for the twenty
drugs that were withdrawn in the UK or US from 1993 to 2004 and
approved in the UK or US after 1988, pre-approval data submitted to
the regulators contained signals of the safety problems that ultimately
led to drug withdrawal in fifteen of those cases (75%). The figure is
71% (12/17) if the three re-instated drugs (alosetron, tolcapone and
sertindole) are excluded. Evidently, such pre-market signals were
Fig. 4. Divergent regulatory outcomes 1993–2004. NM-US – Not Marketed in
US: Approved and later withdrawn in UK but never marketed in US. Unknown
whether approval sought in US. NA-US – Not Approved in US: Approved and
later withdrawn in UK. Approval sought in US but drug never marketed there.
NM-UK – Not Marketed in UK: Approved and later withdrawn in US but never
marketed in UK. Unknown whether approval sought in UK. NA-UK – Not
Approved in UK: Approved and later withdrawn in US. Approval sought in UK
directly (or via EU regulatory procedure) but drug never marketed there. NW-
US – Not Withdrawn in US: Safety withdrawal in UK but left on US market (or
discontinued in US by manufacturer, but not for safety reasons). DW-US –
Delayed Withdrawal in US: At least a year's delay between withdrawal in UK
and subsequent withdrawal in US. NW-UK – Not Withdrawn in UK: Safety
withdrawal in US but still marketed in UK (or discontinued in UK by manu-
facturer, but not for safety reasons). DW-UK –Delayed Withdrawal in UK: At
least a year's delay between withdrawal in US and subsequent withdrawal in
UK.
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present for an even higher proportion of DSWs in 1993–2004 than in
1971–1992. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that, in all fifteen of those cases,
FDA detected those safety signals in its pre-approval assessment, but
nonetheless approved ten of them (67%) on to the US market. Mostly,
these were strong signals of safety problems recognised by regulators
with minimal doubt that the toxicities were drug-related. By contrast, in
1971–1992, FDA approved only 25% (2/8) drugs when it had detected
in pre-market assessment the safety problem that ultimately led to
withdrawal (Abraham and Davis, 2005). We found that FDA approved
more unsafe drugs in 1993–2004 than in 1971–1992 not principally
because the safety problems could not be detected, but rather because
of a more permissive risk-benefit interpretation placed upon them by
the regulatory agency upon detection. Thus, H2 must be rejected.
H3: Since the early 1990s, FDA has become more willing to approve
less safe drugs or leave such drugs on the market, rather than withdraw
them, because patient pressure for access to new drugs has grown in the
US and is more powerful than in the UK/EU.
Along with some arguments by Carpenter (2004, 2010) and
Daemmrich (2004), several senior FDA officials have suggested that
AIDS activists' criticisms of the agency in the late 1980s/early 1990s for
not approving AIDS drugs fast enough shifted FDA's orientation away
from its earlier, more risk-averse ‘paternalistic’ approach to drug reg-
ulation (disease-politics theory). However, this does not explain why
FDA extended its less risk-averse permissive regulatory approach during
1993–2004 to all new drugs, the majority of which according to FDA's
own evaluations, offered little or no therapeutic advance (Davis and
Abraham, 2013). Based on our analyses of internal regulatory docu-
ments, including public expert advisory committee meetings, we found
that patient pressure influenced FDA's post-marketing safety regulation
of the IBS drug, alosetron, but had little significance in the cases of
tolcapone, trovafloxacin and levacetylmethadol, which were either not
withdrawn or had a delayed withdrawal in the US (Woodcock, 2002).
Although patient pressure was less significant in the UK, evident from
its absence from decision-making in our case-history analyses, we found
scant evidence to support H3.
H4: During 1993–2004, UK/EU regulators’ reluctance to non-ap-
prove or withdraw unsafe drugs has grown slower than at FDA because
post-market risk management was more difficult and less used in the EU
due to Member State differences in the organisation/delivery of
healthcare.
EMA and FDA sometimes require manufacturers to conduct specific
studies in order to inform regulatory management of post-market drug
risks. We found no evidence to support conjecture H4 (put forward by
some UK and EU regulators). In the most relevant cases of tolcapone,
trovafloxacin and levacetylmethadol, it was the risk management tools
(e.g. liver function and ECG monitoring), accepted by FDA, which were
judged to be inadequate by the EMA-CHMP because the latter insisted
that the manufacturers should provide clinical evidence that those
drugs benefited a sub-group of patients intolerant/unresponsive to al-
ternative therapies. These were not cases of international differences in
regulatory-management capability, but rather cases where EMA-CHMP
imposed higher evidential standards than FDA to support manu-
facturers’ risk management plans (e.g. EMA [1999]).
H5: FDA and UK regulators approved and withdrew more unsafe
drugs during 1993–2004 than in 1971–1992 because of faster drug
review times post-PDUFA in the US and after MCA's policy of
Table 4
Presence, detection and approval of safety problems leading to withdrawal of drugs approved 1989–2004.
Drug Reason for withdrawal PPMT DMPT (by) FDAA&M UKA&M
remoxipride aplastic anaemia no no no yes
nebacumab excess mortality yes yes(FDA) unknown(CHMP) no yes
pumactant excess mortality no no no yes
sertindole long-QT-arrythmia/torsades de-pointes yes yes(FDA)
unknown(MCA)
no yes
flosequinan excess mortality yes yes(FDA) unknown(MCA) yes yes
cisapride long-QT/torsades possibly possibly(FDA)
no(MCA)
yes yes
levacetylmethadol long-QT/torsades yes yes(FDA) yes(CHMP) yes yes
nefazodone liver toxicity no no yes yes
dexfenfluramine primary-pulmonry hypertension (PPH) & cardiac valvulopathy yes(PPH)
possibly (valvulopathy)
PPH yes(FDA)
valvulopathy no(FDA & MCA)
yes yes
cerivastatin rhabdomyolysis yes(0.4 & 0.8 mg) yes(FDA)
possibly(MCA)
yes yes
mibefradil long-QT/drug interaction (DI) yes QT yes(FDA)
DI yes(MCA)
yes yes
grepafloxacin long-QT/torsades yes yes(FDA)
unknown(MCA)
yes yes
troglitazone liver toxicity yes yes(FDA)
unknown(MCA)
yes yes
tolcapone liver toxicity yes yes(FDA)
yes(CHMP)
yes yes
trovafloxacin liver toxicity yes yes(FDA)
yes(CHMP)
yes yes
rotavirus vaccine intussusception yes yes(FDA)
yes(CHMP)
yes yes
rofecoxib myocardial infarction/stroke probably not no(FDA)
no(MCA)
yes yes
bromfenac liver toxicity yes yes(FDA)
unknown(MCA)
no yes
rapacuronium bronchospasm yes yes(FDA)
unknown(EU)
no yes
alosetron ischaemic colitis yes yes(FDA)
possibly(CHMP)
no yes
PPMT: reason for DSW present in pre-market testing data submitted.
DMPT: reason for DSW detected by regulatory agency in pre-market testing submitted before approval/marketing in that country.
FDAA&M: FDA-approved and marketed in US.
UKA&M: Approved on to UK market by British/EU regulatory systems.
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shortening review times in the UK.
The Institute of Medicine (2006) argues that, under PDUFA, FDA
scientists have less time to review new drug applications, so are more
likely to miss signals of safety problems. We found some cases (trogli-
tazone and rapacuronium) where PDUFA deadlines caused FDA to rush
approval leading to problematic regulatory evaluations, but H5 does
not fit most of our cohort. As explained, strong safety signals were de-
tected by FDA reviewers before approval of many DSWs, so the main
explanation was not that safety signals were missed. Moreover, review
times for many US DSWs were longer than average FDA review times
for all drugs approved in the same year: nefazodone (40 months, year-
average 23 months); dexfenfluramine (35 months, year-average 18
months); bromfenac (30 months, year-average 15 months); tolcapone
(20 months, year-average 13 months). Hence, H5 makes only a minor
contribution to explaining our trends.
Regarding the UK, in some cases (e.g. troglitazone), over-reliance on
industry summaries of data led MCA to accept company interpretations
of safety/efficacy data challenged by FDA. Yet, we found no compelling
evidence that post-1988 MCA cuts to review times led to overall in-
creases in UK DSWs, though during 1993–2004, UK regulatory autho-
rities were more likely than in 1971–1992 to leave less-safe drugs on
the UK market after withdrawal in the US. That permissive tendency
might have suppressed observable increases in UK DSWs.
H6: During 1993–2004, FDA became more willing than in
1971–1992 to approve less-safe drugs on to the market and/or leave
such drugs on the market, rather than withdraw them, because of a
change in its political and institutional culture.
This is the best explanation for the dramatic change in US DSW
regulatory outcomes and has been raised by many FDA scientists. Such
change was multi-faceted, not confined solely to reduced review times
or industry fees per se. Industry fees to fund FDA drug review markedly
increased the extent to which the agency regarded industry, rather than
the American public, as its ‘client’. FDA internal documents suggest that
the primary focus of the agency became meeting PDUFA deadlines to
approve drugs (Federal Register, 2000). Crucially, this shift in institu-
tional culture led to more permissive safety and risk-benefit assessments
by regulators.
We found FDA regulators were withdrawn from drug reviews and
their recommendations for non-approval were over-ruled (as occurred
with troglitazone and bromfenac). Some FDA scientists have suggested
in public testimony that recommendations to approve drugs were not
questioned, whereas recommendations to non-approve were always
interrogated and reviewers critical of industry submissions were un-
likely to be promoted because FDA managers during 1993–2004 in-
creasingly prioritised getting drugs on the market (Institute of
Medicine, 2006).
That FDA reviewers felt increasingly pressured by agency manage-
ment to approve drugs during 1993–2004 is supported by three surveys.
One in 1998 to 172 medical reviewing officers, of whom 53 responded,
found that 64% (34/53) believed that pressure on them to approve new
drugs was ‘somewhat greater’ or ‘much greater’ compared with before
1995. Nineteen (36%) identified 27 drug approvals they had reviewed
during the past three years that they thought should not have been
approved, while only five (9%) identified 6 drugs they thought should
have been approved in those three years, but were not. The survey
recorded 32 occasions of medical officers being asked to withhold cri-
ticism of a drug so as not to jeopardise its approval (Public Citizen,
1998). A second by FDA itself in 2001 reported that over one-third of
FDA-CDER staff felt that non-approvals were stigmatised in FDA, while
a third survey by US Department of Human and Health Services (DHHS)
Office of the Inspector General in 2002 found that 72 of 401 (18%) FDA
scientists were pressured to recommend approval of drugs ‘despite re-
servations about safety/efficacy/quality’ (DHHS, 2003).
H6 is also favoured because it can account for the fact that, despite
safety signals often detected by FDA scientists in 1993–2004, the drugs
were nevertheless approved on to the US market, and that this
happened more than it did during 1971–1992. Furthermore, change in
FDA's regulatory culture, including introduction of programmes to risk
manage drugs on the market instead of withdrawing them, explains our
finding that FDA delayed withdrawal of unsafe drugs from the market
much more during 1993–2004 than 1971–1992 (FDA, 1999).
Yet H6 says nothing about why political/institutional changes to the
UK regulatory authorities (increased industry-fee dependence, reduced
review times, and expanded responsiveness to industry) did not gen-
erate similar transformations in UK DSW outcomes during 1993–2004
to those seen in the US. One explanation is that, before 1989, the British
regulatory authorities were already half-funded by industry fees, had
some of the fastest review times in the Western world, and already saw
their role as being very industry-responsive (Abraham, 1995:66-77).
Consequently, unlike the US, the post-1988 changes at MCA did not
amount to correspondingly dramatic shifts in political and institutional
culture. Additionally, insofar as the Executive arm of the British Gov-
ernment set priorities for UK drug safety regulation, they have not
changed dramatically between 1976 and 2004 (House of Commons
Health Committee, 2005). Indeed, during 1993–2004, the UK reg-
ulatory agency moderated its high level of industry-responsiveness by
introducing constraints on industry conflicts of interests of its expert
advisors. Thus, the bureaucratic, financial, legislative, and political/
ideological changes that explain the dramatically altered US DSW
outcomes post-1992 are either absent or much less marked in the UK
from 1993 to 2004.
A second explanation is the establishment of EMA in 1995 after
which many new drugs entered the UK market via centralised EU reg-
ulatory decision-making. EMA applied more stringent safety regulation
than FDA in several cases (e.g. levacetylmethadol, tolcapone, and tro-
vafloxacin) in 1993–2004. The relatively permissive UK regulatory
approach during 1971–1992 was, therefore, partly attenuated after
1995 by EMA-CHMP, which partly offset internal organisational ten-
dencies towards greater industry responsiveness at MCA from 1989.
3. Conclusion and policy implications
1993–2004 saw a quantitative change from the UK having twice as
many DSWs as the US during 1971–1992 to both countries having a
similar number, though the UK continues to have slightly more DSWs in
the later period on most measures (partly explained by FDA leaving
more unsafe drugs on the market). This convergence is almost entirely
due to the dramatic increase in US DSWs in the later period, while UK
DSWs have remained relatively stable at their comparatively high
1971–1992 levels. The nature of the DSW regulatory landscape also
changed from one in 1971–1992 dominated by unsafe drugs being
approved/marketed in the UK and then having to be withdrawn in the
UK (but never approved/marketed in the US) to a situation in
1993–2004 strongly characterised by unsafe drugs being withdrawn
from the UK market and those same drugs being left on the US market.
Furthermore, FDA approved more unsafe drugs in 1993–2004 than
1971–1992 not principally because the safety problems could not be
detected pre-approval, but rather because of the more permissive risk-
benefit interpretations adopted by the agency upon pre-approval de-
tection. To a first approximation, the convergence of the two regulatory
systems for drug safety in 1993–2004 may be characterised as FDA
becoming much more like the UK regulatory system (of 1971–92 and
1993–2004) than the FDA of 1971–92.
Assuming the fundamental purpose of drug safety regulation is
protection of patients from unsafe drugs then FDA performance con-
siderably worsened during 1993–2004 compared with 1971–1992,
while there was much less erosion (from a relatively low base) in such
UK regulatory performance. The altered political and institutional cul-
ture at FDA during 1993–2004 is the best explanation for the agency's
worsening performance. This explanation cannot be reduced solely to
shortened drug review times or industry fees per se.
Rather, it must be seen in the transformational context of the post-
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PDUFA regulatory culture in which FDA funding (via industry fees)
became dependent on industry-Congress-defined performance goals to
approve drugs faster and view industry as a partner/client in facilitating
the availability and maintenance of drugs on the market as opposed to a
more adversarial/critical stance towards manufacturers’ claims about
the safety (and efficacy) of their products. This then led to an increased
tendency, relative to 1971–1992, to adopt more permissive and less
precautionary interpretations of the substantive risk-benefit judgements
about individual drugs – overplaying benefits and rationalising how
risks could be managed on the market within both pre-market assess-
ment and post-market safety evaluation. British drug regulatory cul-
ture, by contrast, exhibited a picture of much more continuity between
the two periods.
Our discovery that both regulatory agencies’ performance deterio-
rated by leaving unsafe drugs on the market more during 1993–2004
than in 1971–1992 raises the spectre that had there not been this more
permissive post-market regulatory stance in the later period, there
might well have been more DSWs in both countries during 1993–2004.
In short, our quantitative analysis of DSWs probably understates the
deterioration of pre-market drug safety regulation in the later period.
Our conclusion that US drug safety regulation declined in the later
period is supported by Olson (2008, 2013), who demonstrated very
significant increases in the number of serious and fatal adverse drug
reactions (per drug) reported by US healthcare professionals during
1990–2004.
Evidently, FDA performed significantly better in drug safety reg-
ulation during 1971–1992 than during 1993–2004 and better than the
UK in either 1971–1992 or 1993–2004. The policy implication is that,
as a first step to improve drug safety regulation, the UK and US gov-
ernments should both re-orientate their regulatory cultures to be more
compatible with the FDA model of 1971–1992 (not that that model was
flawless).
The main limitation of this study is that regulatory case-history data
were much less extensive in the UK (due to state secrecy) than in the
US, making our judgements about UK regulators’ pre-approval knowl-
edge more difficult (see Table 4). A second limitation in relation to
overall drug regulatory policy is the safety focus. Overall drug regula-
tion in the interests of public health must also weigh the safety deficit of
1993–2004 in both countries (relative to FDA in 1971–1992) against
possible benefits of faster approval of new drugs during 1993–2004.
However, research on pharmaceutical innovations (NMEs) shows that
the number of NMEs offering significant therapeutic advance approved
by FDA between 1993 and 2004, actually declined, and that only about
10% of NMEs marketed in the US or Europe represented therapeutic
advance (Angell, 2004; Abraham and Davis, 2007; Davis and Abraham,
2013; Light and Lexchin, 2012; Van Luijn et al., 2010:445). Hence,
deterioration in safety regulation was not compensated for by faster
access to more therapeutically important innovations. Rather, dete-
riorating safety regulation went hand in hand with expedited approvals
that did not drive a growth in therapeutically valuable innovations
available to patients. Given this and based on our empirical findings,
one can confidently reject neo-liberal and disease-politics theories as
inadequate accounts of regulatory change between these two periods,
but our findings are consistent with corporate bias and capture theories.
Following the major drug safety disaster of Vioxx in 2004,
Governments implemented drug safety reforms, but focused solely on
post-marketing. The 2007 US Food and Drug Amendments Act asserted
FDA powers to compel post-market safety studies and label changes.
FDA was empowered to use PDUFA funds for post-marketing safety
surveillance, such as Sentinel systems through which the agency con-
tracts such surveillance to university-based researchers with access to
large-scale healthcare databases in order to detect safety signals.
However, our findings imply that both UK and US regulatory agencies
are on a trajectory of increasingly leaving drugs on the market even
after detection of safety problems, and in the US increasingly permitting
drug approval despite major safety signals being evident in pre-market
regulatory assessment. FDA's reluctance to withdraw products from the
market, and instead issue safety warnings to limit product use to spe-
cific patient sub-populations has continued beyond 2004 (Moore et al.,
2012). Furthermore, accelerated pathways to drug approval based on
less safety data has continued beyond 2004 unabated and would seem
to undermine detection/investigation of safety signals, while using
‘patient demand’ (disease-politics theory) as an unwarranted ideolo-
gical legitimation for such policies (Davis and Abraham, 2013). The
post-Vioxx reforms, which merit separate research, do not seem to
address these problems. Rather, what is required is a re-shaping of
regulatory culture into a less permissive approach to prescription drug
safety (and benefit) assessments via composite political changes in
Executive mission, legislative oversight, and public accountability that
prioritise drug safety over responsiveness to industry interests and ap-
proval deadlines. Yet, in both countries, much of the regulatory cultures
of 1993–2004 remain and are likely to converge further due to align-
ment of their safety data requirements and regulatory standards under
the International Conference on Harmonisation since 2013 (Wiktor-
owisz et al., 2018). Consequently, regulation protecting citizens from
unsafe drugs may continue to be sub-optimal.
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